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CHANGES IN THE CLEAN WATER ACT SINCE KEPONE:
WOULD THEY HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE?
William Goldfarb*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the anti-regulatory climate that currently pervades the
American political scene, it is important to emphasize the pal-
pable and significant accomplishments of environmental reg-
ulation. One measure of the success of environmental law dur-
ing the past twenty-five years is that long-term, relatively local-
ized environmental contamination-such as the pollution of the
lower James River by Kepone between 1966 and
1975-probably can no longer occur in the United States.' Ma-
jor environmental statutes, enacted during the decade between
1976 and 1986, have precluded continuing environmental abus-
es of this scope and magnitude. The Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), enacted in 1976, establishes a compre-
hensive system for tracking and managing hazardous wastes
from "cradle to grave."2 The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) passed in
1980 and extensively amended in 1986,' erects an administra-
* Professor of Environmental Law, Cook College, Rutgers University. A.B., 1959,
Colgate University;, J.D., 1962, Yale Law School; Ph.D., 1974, Columbia University.
Funding for this research was provided, in part, by the New Jersey Agricultural Ex-
periment Station.
1. Sudden and catastrophic events, such as the wreck of the Exxon Valdez, are
still very much a threat to the integrity of the environment. In addition, long-term,
massive pollution on a global scale (e.g., global climate change) has not been ad-
dressed adequately by environmental regulation. Moreover, as shall be pointed out,
the health and safety of industrial workers are insufficiently protected by water pollu-
tion control laws. See infra part IV.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET
AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SocIETY 927-46 (1992 &
Supp. 1994) [hereinafter NLS].
3. CERCLA was amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (SARA). Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). See NLS supra note
2, at 279.
603
604 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:603
tive mechanism for cleaning up certain hazardous waste dispos-
al sites and, where possible, allocating responsibility jointly and
severally for the expenses of response and remediation to gener-
ators, transporters, treaters, storers, and disposers of hazardous
wastes.4 Title III of the SARA amendments of 1986 (also
known as the Emergency Planning And Community Right-To-
Know Act) requires that information about the use, location,
and release of over three hundred hazardous chemicals be re-
ported to local, state, and federal authorities.5 These and other
federal statutes,6 along with their state counterparts, assure
that another Kepone-type incident is not likely to occur again
in the United States.
The object of this article is to analyze the 1977 and 1987
amendments to the Clean Water Act, originally enacted in
1972, 7 from the standpoint of how they might have prevented
or attenuated the environmental impacts of the manufacture of
Kepone in Hopewell, Virginia, from 1966 to 1975, and, analo-
gously, how they might deter such socially irresponsible conduct
today. This article will most intensely scrutinize amendments to
section 309 of the CWA, the section entitled "Federal Enforce-
ment."
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see NLS supra note 2, at
243-320, 882-926. For a decision imposing "arranged for" liability on companies that
"tolled" the manufacture of a pesticide, similar to the arrangement between Allied
Chemical and Life Science in the Kepone situation, see United States v. Aceto Agri-
cultural Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989). Under the Aceto rule, it is
clear that if the Life Science site had been listed on the Superfimd National Priority
List (NPL), Allied Chemical would have been liable under CERCLA for the costs of
cleaning up the site. For a summary of the Kepone incident, see infra notes 9-15 and
accompanying text.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
6. For other federal statutes that might be relevant to an incident similar to the
Kepone pollution of Hopewell, Virginia, and the lower James River, see NLS, supra
note 2, at 244-255.
7. The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [herein-
after CWA] is the statutorily-sanctioned common name of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 were enacted by Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816. Section 2 of the Clean Water
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 1, 91 Stat. 1566, amended section 518 to allow the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act to be commonly referred to as the Clean Water
Act. The Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7, was the most
recent set of major amendments to the CWA_
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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Part I briefly recapitulates the history of the Kepone inci-
dent. Part II will generally describe and evaluate the relevant
portions of the 1977 CWA amendments, and Part III will simi-
larly deal with the 1987 amendments. Part IV will focus specifi-
cally on the statutory changes that have been made since 1976
in the criminal enforcement provisions of section 309. Part V
will summarize prior conclusions and make recommendations
for further changes to the CWA.
II. THE KEPONE INCIDENT 9
Allied Chemical Corporation (Allied Chemical), now known by
its post-merger name of Allied-Signal, Inc. (Allied-Signal), has
long been engaged in the research, development, manufacture,
and sale of agricultural and industrial chemicals.
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, Allied Chemical de-
veloped a chemical pesticide known as Kepone, marketed pri-
marily in Europe as an insecticide in potato farming and in
Central America for use in banana groves. Allied Chemical's
initial testing of Kepone revealed the substance to be highly
toxic to all species tested and to cause cancer, liver damage;
reproductive system failure, and the inhibition of growth and
muscular coordination in fish, birds, and mammals. Despite
these negative test results, the United States Department of
Agriculture granted a pesticide registration to Allied Chemical
for Kepone. Allied Chemical, however, voluntarily withdrew its
petition to the Food and Drug Administration for the establish-
ment of Kepone residue tolerances for agricultural products,
thus assuring that the pesticide would not be applied in the
United States.0
Between 1958 and 1966, Kepone was manufactured for Allied
Chemical by other companies under "tolling contracts," a com-
mon arrangement in the chemical and oil industries." In 1966,
9. The following summary has been distilled from William Goldfarb, Kepone: A
Case Study, 8 ENv. L. 645 (1978), excerpted in NLS supra note 2, at 28-101, 321-56,
and from Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2672 (1992), affd
without opinion, 54 F.3d 767 (3d Cir. 1995).
10. Goldfarb, supra note 9, at 646.
11. Allied-Signal, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2673.
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however, foreign demand for Kepone increased, and Allied
Chemical decided to manufacture the pesticide in its Semi-
Works facility in Hopewell, Virginia.' Allied Chemical employ-
ees prepared a production manual, which recommended precau-
tions such as spill and dust control, as well as protective cloth-
ing for Kepone workers."
The Allied Chemical Semi-Works at Hopewell discharged
production waste directly into Gravelly Run, a tributary of the
James River. In 1970, the Federal government instituted a
surface water discharge permit program under the Refuse Act
of 1899.' On its Refuse Act Permit application, Allied Chemi-
cal listed its Kepone discharges on a short-form application as
temporary, unmetered, and unsampled, in order to avoid having
to treat Kepone wastes."
In 1972 the Refuse Act Permit Program was abolished, but a
new permit program had been enacted by Congress-the Na-
tional Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit
program under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972." In response to a request by the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA), which administered the NPDES
program before its delegation to Virginia in 1974, Allied Chemi-
cal once again listed its Kepone discharge as temporary,
unmetered, and unsampled. 7
In 1973, Allied Chemical underwent a corporate reorganiza-
tion, and, as a result, decided to once again toll Kepone produc-
tion." The processing company chosen by Allied Chemical was
Life Science Products Company (Life Science). This company
was owned by two former employees of Allied Chemical, Wil-
liam Moore and Virgil Hundtofte, both of whom were experi-
enced in the production of Kepone. Moore had been the director
of research in the agricultural division of Allied Chemical, and
12. Id.
13. Goldfarb, supra note 9, at 647.
14. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467n (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
15. Goldfarb, supra note 9, at 647-48.
16. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The FWPCA is now referred to as
the Clean Water Act. See supra note 8.
17. Goldfarb, supra note 9, at 648.
18. Id. at 648-49.
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Hundtofte had been the manager of the Allied Chemical facility
in Hopewell. 9 Moore also held a patent with respect to the
manufacture of Kepone.2 °
On November 30, 1973, Allied Chemical and Life Science
entered into a tolling agreement whereby Life Science would
manufacture Kepone for Allied Chemical.2' The tolling contract
provided that Allied Chemical would provide-at its own ex-
pense-all of the raw materials for Kepone production, with the
title to remain in Allied Chemical.2 Within certain broad lim-
its, Allied Chemical would determine the monthly production
rate of Kepone, which would be packed in Allied Chemical
containers and transported in Allied Chemical trucks.' Allied
Chemical also agreed to pay a large percentage of Life Science's
taxes and capital expenditures. Life Science was to receive
between 32 and 38 cents per pound of Kepone over 650,000
pounds per year. The next highest competing bid for Allied
Chemical's Kepone tolling contract had been $3.00 per pound.2"
Moore and Hundtofte agreed not to produce Kepone for any
company other than Allied Chemical and not to dispose of their
shares in Life Science without Allied Chemical's consent.2 7 As
part of the tolling arrangement, Allied Chemical provided Life
Science with its production manuals and guidebooks with re-
spect to Kepone manufacture. Allied Chemical also supplied
Life Science with warning labels for Kepone containers, alerting
users that Kepone "may be fatal if swallowed, inhaled, or ab-
sorbed through the skin," and cautioning them to wash thor-
oughly after handling and to refrain from breathing Kepone
dust or vapor.2
19. Id. at 649.
20. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2762, 2674 (1992), affd




24. Goldfarb, supra note 9, at 649-50.
25. Id. at 649.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2672, 2674 (1992).
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"In March 1974, Life Science began manufacturing Kepone
for [Allied Chemical], using a converted gas station in Hopewell
as its processing plant."29 Allied Chemical officials regularly
toured Life Science's plant and sampled and analyzed Life
Science's effluent. Whereas Allied Chemical had discharged the
residues of its Kepone production process directly into tributar-
ies of the James River, Life Science decided to become an "indi-
rect discharger" to the Hopewell Publicly Owned Treatment
Works (POTW), which was then incapable of treating Life
Science's Kepone wastes. The Director of the POTW (another
former Allied Chemical employee) recommended to Hopewell's
City Manager that Life Science become the only industrial
discharger allowed to discharge into the municipal sewerage
system. ° The POTW did not reveal on its NPDES application
the presence of Kepone in its influent or effluent. The Common-
wealth of Virginia, which in the interim had received delegation
of the NPDES program from EPA, finally learned of Life
Science's indirect discharge into the Hopewell POTW in October
1974 when the sludge digester at the POTW failed because it
had been contaminated by Kepone. Virginia and EPA officials
conducted negotiations with Life Science, resulting in the impo-
sition of a Kepone pretreatment standard on Life Science in
June 1975."' Allied Chemical participated in these negotiations
and agreed to pay for the pollution control equipment that Life
Science would require in order to meet the pretreatment stan-
dard. European demand for Kepone had strengthened, and
Allied Chemical was eager to substantially increase Life
Science's Kepone production. However, even after the control
equipment was installed, the pretrdatment standard was violat-
ed in nearly all samplings taken.32
In July 1975, as Life Science was preparing for increased
Kepone production, the Virginia Department of Health was
alerted by a local physician and the Center for Disease Control
in Atlanta, Georgia, that many Life Science employees and
members of their families were suffering from Kepone poison-
29. Id.
30. Goldfarb, supra note 9, at 650.
31. Id. at 651.
32. Id. at 651-52.
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ing. Virginia Health Department officials found substantiation
for the complaints, and immediately ordered the Life Science
plant to close down. The Kepone poisoning occurred because
Life Science either failed to follow or ignored well-known safety
precautions in Kepone manufacture. Life Science became insol-
vent when its plant was closed.
As many as sixty-two current and former Life Science em-
ployees suffered from Kepone poisoning. The operations of Life
Science resulted in Kepone contamination of the atmosphere,
soil, and waterways. EPA reported Kepone particulates in the
atmosphere as far away as Richmond. Pervasive Kepone con-
tamination had also occurred at the Life Science plant, in the
soil at the plant site, in a section of the Hopewell landfill
where POTW sludge had been dumped, and in a lagoon adja-
cent to the Hopewell POTW's outfall pipe. EPA also found that
the James River and its local tributaries had unacceptable
levels of Kepone, as did shellfish and finfish taken from the
river. In late July 1975, in response to these reports, the Gover-
nor of Virginia ordered the closing of the James River and
portions of the Chesapeake Bay to sport and commercial fish-
ing.
During the latter half of 1975, Allied Chemical voluntarily
decontaminated the Life Science plant site at a cost of nearly
one million dollars. Allied Chemical also sponsored health tests
for former Life Science workers and conducted intensive re-
search on methods of retrieving Kepone from the James River
and incinerating Kepone residuals. In early 1976, Allied Chemi-
cal donated $88,000 to the Medical College of Virginia for moni-
toring and treating former Life Science employees who had
been severely affected by Kepone. As a result of these studies,
the College's medical team perfected a technique for accelerat-
ing elimination of Kepone from the human body, thereby speed-
ing the recovery of those persons who had suffered from Kepone
poisoning.
In early 1976, the United States Attorney for the Richmond,
Virginia area empaneled a grand jury to consider whether fed-
eral criminal charges should be brought against Allied Chem-
ical, its past and present employees, Moore, Hundtofte, Life
Science, and the City of Hopewell for actions relating to the
6091995]
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Kepone incident. On May 7, 1976, the grand jury returned its
first indictment against Allied Chemical on 940 counts of dis-
charging Kepone and other chemicals from its Hopewell com-
plex between 1971 and 1974, which was when Life Science
began manufacturing Kepone for Allied Chemical under the
tolling agreement. The first indictment also included a number
of conspiracy counts against Allied Chemical and its employees
arising out of Allied Chemical's deceptive permit applications.
The grand jury returned a second indictment, charging Allied
Chemical, Life Science, Hundtofte, Moore, and the City of
Hopewell with criminal responsibility for Life Science's illegal
discharges into the Hopewell POTW after 1974. Hopewell was
also charged with failure to report the presence of Kepone in its
sewerage system. In attempting to hold Allied Chemical vicari-
ously liable for Life Science's discharges, the United States
relied upon three legal theories in the second indictment: (1)
that Life Science was an instrumentality of Allied Chemical; (2)
that Life Science was acting as an agent of Allied Chemical;
and (3) that Allied Chemical was an accomplice of Life Science.
On August 2, 1976, the grand jury returned a third indictment
against Allied Chemical, which added a fourth ground for vicar-
ious liability: that Allied Chemical and LSP were engaged in a
conspiracy to violate pollution control laws.33
The City of Hopewell was allowed to plea bargain and re-
ceived a $10,000 fine. After agreeing to testify for the United
States, Hundtofte and Moore were also allowed to plea bargain,
and received fines of $25,000 each. Life Science pleaded nolo
contendere and received a fine of approximately four million
dollars, a meaningless gesture in light of the company's insol-
vency.
Allied Chemical, which had originally pleaded not guilty to
all counts, was permitted by the trial judge, the Honorable
Robert R. Mehrige, Jr., of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, to change its plea to nolo con-
tendere on the 940 counts of first indictment. Allied Chemical's
33. The allegation charging that Allied Chemical and certain of its employees
conspired to file false applications and reports with EPA was dismissed on the
ground that a corporation cannot be engaged in a conspiracy with its own employees.
610 [Vol. 29:603
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nolo contendre plea gave it a profound tactical advantage over a
plea or verdict of guilty. The conviction of a defendant after a
nolo plea cannot be used as evidence in subsequent civil actions
for damages, such as the civil suits actually brought against
Allied Chemical by former Life Science workers and local com-
mercial fishermen, marina owners, restaurant owners, etc.'
For its conviction on the 940 counts of the first indictment,
Allied Chemical was fined $13,240,000. Judge Mehrige later
reduced the fine to five million dollars, on the stipulation that
Allied Chemical transfer eight million dollars to the Virginia
Environmental Endowment Fund for scientific research on al-
leviating the effects of Kepone and other environmental issues
relevant to the Chesapeake Bay area. Allied Chemical's attempt
to deduct its contribution to the Virginia Environmental Endow-
ment Fund from its gross corporate income as an ordinary and
necessary business expense was prohibited by the Internal
Revenue Service, and later by the Tax Court of the United
States and the Third Circuit."
Allied Chemical settled for $5,250,000 (in addition to the
nearly one million dollars it had already spent in cleaning up
the Life Science plant site) all of the claims of the Common-
wealth of Virginia and the City of Hopewell for Kepone-related
costs that these governmental entities had incurred, as well as
penalties assessed by the Virginia Water Control Board. The
Internal Revenue Service allowed Allied Chemical to treat this
payment as a deductible expense. Allied also was forced to
settle dozens of lawsuits, that were brought by workers and
directly injured neighbors, with total payments amounting to
more than fifteen million dollars.36
However, after a bench trial, Judge Mehrige acquitted Allied
Chemical of all counts of the second and third indictments,
which charged Allied Chemical with vicarious liability for Life
Science's discharges. Despite Allied Chemical's close involve-
ment with Life Science's manufacturing and pollution control
operations, Judge Mehrige was not convinced beyond a reason-
34. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981).
35. See supra note 9.
36. NLS, supra note 2 at 343.
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able doubt that Life Science had acted as an instrumentality,
an agent, an accomplice, or a co-conspirator of Allied Chemical.
III. THE 1977 CWA AMENDMENTS
The Clean Water Act of 1977 3 was widely seen as encom-
passing a set of "mid-course corrections" to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1972. 3' The Kepone incident was
clearly very much in the minds of members of Congress while
they were considering these mid-course corrections.39 Four sec-
tions of the 1977 amendments were directly inspired by the
Kepone incident and major pollution events similar to it.
A. Control of Toxic Pollutants
The CWA's original toxic pollutant control mechanism was a
cumbersome, pollutant-by-pollutant, harm-based system that
resulted in little control of toxic pollutants.4 Rejecting this
exercise in futility, EPA decided to regulate toxic pollutants
primarily through technology-based effluent limitations. EPA's
decision was upheld by the famous "Consent Decree of 1976.""'
This decree established timetables for EPA to promulgate efflu-
ent limitations based on Best Available Technology Economical-
ly Achievable (BAT) for many industrial categories covering
sixty-five families of compounds, which EPA has broken down
into 126 "priority pollutants."42 This new approach to regulat-
37. Pub. L. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977).
38. The term "mid-course corrections" appears frequently in the legislative history
of the 1977 amendments. See, e.g., Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91
Stat. 1566 (1977) reprinted in COMM. ON ENV'T AND PuB. WORKS, 95TH CONG., 2D
SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977 at 326 (1978)
(Statement of House Managers on the Conference Report) [hereinafter LEG. HIST.
1977)].
39. References to the Kepone incident appear more than a dozen times in the
legislative history of the 1977 amendments. See LEG. HIST. 1977, supra note 38, at
334, 335, 338, 430, 453, 454, 477, 549, 550, 863, 883, 886, 909.
40. Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, § 307(a); NLS, supra note 2, at 842; LEG. HIST.
1977, supra note 38, at 326-327 ("Procedural requirements have proven insurmount-
able for the Agency, to the point where only six toxic chemicals ... have been regu-
lated ... in five years").
41. Also known as the "Flannery Decree," after the district court judge in the
underlying case of NRDC v. Train, 6 Envtl. L. Rep. 20588 (D.D.C. June 9, 1976).
42. For a description and analysis of the CWA's categorical, technology-based
612 [Vol. 29:603
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ing toxics was codified by the Clean Water Act of 1977.4' The
Kepone incident was closely linked to Congress' recognition that
its original mechanism for regulating toxics had failed."
B. Industrial Pretreatment
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 required EPA to propose regulations within 180 days of
enactment, establishing pretreatment standards for the intro-
duction into POTWs of pollutants "which are determined not to
be susceptible to treatment by such treatment works or which
would interfere with the operation of such treatment works."'
However, the defects of the 1972 Amendments' provisions for
regulating toxic pollutants also prevented EPA from setting
pretreatment standards for toxics.
The "Consent Decree of 1976" applied the categorical, technol-
ogy-based approach to establishing effluent limitations for toxics
to setting pretreatment standards.46 The congressional codifica-
tion of this methodology in the Clean Water Act of 1977 includ-
ed pretreatment standards.47 Although there is no direct sup-
porting evidence in the legislative history, Congress may have
system of setting effluent limitations, see NLS supra note 2, at 825-58.
43. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 53(a), 91 Stat. 1589-90 (codi-
fied as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)-(b)).
44. The reasons EPA virtually ignored toxic substances in the first go-
round of the effluent guidelines program were the complexity of the task,
high costs, the lack of testing methodologies and available data, time con-
straints, and its stated intention to rely on the Section 307(a) chemical-
by-chemical regulatory approach. Thus, EPA developed numerical stan-
dards, telling dischargers in various industrial categories what they had
to do to achieve BPT and BAT for the traditional parameters such as
BOD, suspended solids, and pH, but very little about the control needed
for such chemicals as carbon tetrachloride, Kepone, mirex, and others.
STAFF MEMORANDUMI OF SUBCOMML ON INVESTIGATION AND REvIEw, COMM. ON PUBLIC
WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION, 95TH CONG., 2d SESS. (affixed to floor statement of
House sponsors), reprinted in LEG. HIST. 1977, supra note 38 at 335 (emphasis add-
ed).
45. Clean Water Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, §§ 307(b)-(d), 86 Stat. 857-58
(codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 1317(6)-(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
46. See supra note 42.
47. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 53, 91 Stat. 1589 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1)-(3) (1988)) (referring to "effluent limitations" and
"effluent standards" interchangeably).
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been responding to the Kepone incident in a number of other
1977 CWA amendments regarding pretreatment.
Public Law Number 95-217 introduced provisions (1) enabling
EPA to sue, after thirty days notice to the POTW operator and
the relevant state, a POTW operator and an indirect discharger
that violates pretreatment standards;' (2) requiring a POTW
discharge permittee to identify "in terms of character and vol-
ume of pollutants... any significant source introducing pollut-
ants subject to pretreatment standards ... into such works,"
and to establish "a program to assure compliance with such
pretreatment standards by each such source;"49 and (3) estab-
lishing a new regulatory program governing the disposal of
sewage sludge.5"
C. Best Management Practices to Control Plant Site Runoff
Congress was clearly cognizant of the Kepone incident when
it authorized EPA to promulgate regulations, which, as part of
categorical effluent limitations applicable to dischargers of toxic
pollutants, contain best management practices "to control plant
site runoff, spillage or leaks, sludge or waste disposal, and
drainage from raw material storage."5' These so-called "ancil-
lary discharges" were seen as possessing significant potential to
"contribute significant amounts of [toxic] pollutants to navigable
waters."52 In the Water Quality Act of 1987, the "ancillary in-
dustrial discharges" program was expanded into a major effort
48. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-217, § 54(b), 91 Stat. 1591 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(f) (1988)). In such an action, a federal district court is
authorized to award "appropriate relief, including, but not limited to, a permanent or
temporary injunction." Id.
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(8) (1988).
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1345 (1988). One component of the sludge disposal regulations
was the identification of "concentrations of pollutants which interfere with" the benefi-
cial uses of sewage sludge. 33 U.S.C. § 1345(d)(1)(c).
51. Pub. L. 95-217, § 50, 91 Stat. 1588 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §
1314(e) (1988). According to Senator Muskie, the Senate sponsor of the 1977 amend-
ments bill, "[t]he runoff of Kepone into the James River from outdoor storage areas
could have been prevented" by such a provision. LEG. HIST. 1977, supra note 38, at
454.
52. LEG. HIST. 1977, supra note 38, at 454.
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to regulate industrial stormwater discharges containing toxic
pollutants.53
D. Emergency Response Fund
The Kepone incident was also instrumental in persuading
Congress to establish an emergency fund, authorized at ten
million dollars, "to provide assistance in emergencies caused by
the release into the environment of any pollutant or other con-
taminant including, but not limited to, those which present, or
may reasonably be anticipated to present, an imminent and
substantial danger to the public health or welfare."' The new
emergency response fund provision required EPA to prepare a
contingency plan for responding to emergencies and authorized
the Agency to pursue cost recovery against the owner or opera-
tor of a discharger creating an emergency.55 This 1977 amend-
ment was an important precursor of the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), which was enacted in 1980.56
IV. THE 1987 CWA AMENDMENTS
The Water Quality Act of 1987 1 represented a fine-tuning of
the CWA, in contrast to the major mid-course correction that
had occurred in 1977."8 Nevertheless, the 1987 amendments
included a number of provisions that might deter conduct po-
tentially leading to a Kepone-type incident.
53. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 402, 101 Stat. 7, (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1988)). See sources cited infra notes 63-68.
54. Pub. L. 95-217, § 69, 91 Stat. 1607, repealed by Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 304, 94
Stat. 2767, 2768; see LEG. HIST. 1977, supra note 38, at 477 (containing a brief sum-
mary of the Kepone incident in supporting the creation of an emergency response
fund).
55. Id.
56. CERCLA § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1988) (repealing the duplicative § 304(b)
of the Clean Water Act).
57. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (codified as amend-
ed in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
58. See supra note 16.
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A. Focus On Chesapeake Bay
The 1987 CWA amendments partially incorporated the philos-
ophy of "place-based" environmental protection, which was be-
coming popular during the mid-1980s and is now in the fore-
front of environmental management. 9 Place-based environmen-
tal protection concentrates on particular areas that are (1) espe-
cially vulnerable, through one, or a combination, of past envi-
ronmental degradation, ecological sensitivity, or impending
threat, and (2) ecologically unique.6" These areas cannot recov-
er or retain their environmental integrity, even after the impo-
sition of uniform national pollution control standards, without
additional -controls. Place-based strategies emphasize (1) man-
agement on a larger area scale than traditional pollution con-
trol methods, and (2) the need for "bottom-up" consensus solu-
tions developed and implemented on a regional basis."' One of
the most successful models of place-based environmental man-
agement is the Chesapeake Bay Program.
A 1975 amendment to the CWA had authorized a comprehen-
sive EPA study of the pollution problems of estuarine areas; the
EPA chose the Chesapeake Bay as its initial study area. 2 Re-
leased in 1983, this study identified nutrient enrichment as a
significant area of environmental degradation of the Bay.63 The
findings of this study led directly to the first Chesapeake Bay
Agreement, signed in 1983.' The EPA joined with the govern-
59. Place-based environmental management is referred to by various names, in-
cluding "ecosystem management," "watershed management," and "bioregionalism." See
generally William Goldfarb, Watershed Management: Slogan or Solution?, 21 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 483 (1994).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 498.
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1325 (1988).
63. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1988), reprinted in
COMM. ON ENV'T AND PUB. WORKS, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE WATER QUALITY ACT OF 1987, at 1393-94, 1473-74, 1815 [hereinafter LEG.
HST. 1987] (containing an indirect reference to the Kepone incident). For a history of
the Chesapeake Bay cleanup effort, see BRUCE GALLOWAY, A WORK IN PROGRESS: A
RETROSPECTIVE ON THE FIRST DECADE OF THE CHESAPEAKE BAY RESTORATION (1993),
and TOM HORTON & WILLIAM M. EICHAUM, CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, TURNING
THE TIDE: SAVING THE CHESAPEAKE BAY (1991).
64. GALLOWAY, supra note 63, at 2.
616 [Vol. 29:603
CLEAN WATER ACT SINCE KEPONE
ments of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and the District of
Columbia, as well as the Chesapeake Bay Commission (an
interstate legislative coordinating body), to develop and imple-
ment coordinated plans to improve and protect the water quali-
ty and living resources of the Chesapeake Bay.65 This experi-
ment in intergovernmental coordination (known as the Chesa-
peake Bay Program) established a management structure to
reach decisions, implement environmental protection strategies
formulated through consensus, and measure progress by sys-
tematic and thorough water quality modelling.66
In 1987, the second Chesapeake Bay Agreement was signed
and the CWA was amended to facilitate continuing federal
participation in the Chesapeake Bay Program. The second
agreement called for a forty percent reduction in nutrient loads
reaching the Bay by the year 2000, and the imposition of a
permanent cap at that level after 2000.67 The Water Quality
Act of 1987 authorized three million dollars per year through
fiscal year 1990 for the establishment of an EPA Chesapeake
Bay office" and ten million dollars per year for fifty percent
federal matching implementation grants to states that have
"approved and committed to implement all or substantially all
aspects of the [agreements]." 9 Another section of the 1987
amendments established a new National Estuary Program,
based on the Chesapeake Bay Program model.7' The new pro-
gram encouraged the formation of interstate management con-
ferences to develop comprehensive management plans for other
65. Id.
66. The Chesapeake Bay Program also includes six other federal agencies, repre-
sentatives of local governments, relevant interest groups, and the general public.
According to Galloway, "[n]o other environmental management effort on this scale had
ever been attempted in a system as complex as the Chesapeake." Id. at 10.
67. The 1987 agreement was amended in 1992 to reaffirm the forty percent nu-
trient reduction goal and refine strategies for achieving it. GALLOWAY, supra note 63,
at 11. Between 1984 and 1992, loadings of phosphorus (the limiting nutrient in the
Bay ecosystem) had declined almost thirty percent. HORTON & ELCHBAUM, supra note
63, at 67.
68. The functions of this office were to include information collection and dissem-
ination, coordination of federal and state efforts to protect the Bay, and the determi-
nation of the impacts of pollution loadings on the Bay's ecology, with a particular
emphasis on the striped bass as an indicator species.
69. 33 U.S.C. § 1267(b)(1), (d)(2) (1988).
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1330 (1988).
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threatened estuaries.' Although empirical verification of this
point is impossible, it seems clear that given the current level
of public attention, public resources, and institutional coordina-
tion and commitment devoted to the preservation of the Chesa-
peake Bay, continuing pollution on the massive scale of the
Kepone incident would be inconceivable. For example, the ap-
palling lack of coordination among federal agencies, state and
local governments, and local citizens was one of the major rea-
sons why the Kepone pollution went virtually unaddressed by
regulatory authorities for nearly a decade.72
B. Toxic Hot Spots
In the Water Quality Act of 1987, Congress established a
new program for controlling pollution in so-called "toxic hot
spots," where "[t]he cumulative discharge from several toxic
polluters can result in unacceptable concentrations of toxic
pollutants even after the implementation of technology-based
controls."73 Within two years of enactment, states were re-
quired to identify those bodies of water that would not meet
water quality standards because of toxic pollutants, in spite of
compliance with technology-based effluent limitations by appro-
priate dischargers. For each identified toxic hot spot, states
were to determine the specific point sources discharging toxic
pollutants and the amounts discharged. State submissions to
the EPA were to include "Individual Control Strategies" for
each discharger of toxics to an identified waterbody. Individual
control strategies were to include water quality-based effluent
limitations derived from numerical water quality criteria or
71. Ironically, the interstate management conference was the institutional device
that had failed to curtail water pollution prior to the 1972 Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments. See MARCi BENSTOCK & LEONARD ZWICK, WATER
WASTELAND, Ch. XIV-1 (1971). By 1987, public consciousness of the dangers of water
pollution and public commitment to remedy the problem had resulted in a policy
consensus that validated the management conference-a fundamentally voluntary
institutional structure.
72. See supra part I.
73. LEG. HIST. 1987, supra note 63, at 1324. For a description and analysis of the
interactions between technology-based and harm-based effluent limitations in the
Clean Water Act, see NLS, supra note 2, ch. 19 and WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER
LAW, ch. 27 (2d ed. 1988), [hereinafter WATER LAW].
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from bioassays.74 Individual control strategies were required to
result in compliance with water quality standards no later than
three years after the effective date of the strategy. 5 Within
120 days after a state's submission to the EPA of its set of
individual control strategies, the EPA was to approve or disap-
prove the state submission.76 If a state did not submit its indi-
vidual control strategies within the two-year period, or if EPA
did not approve the state's submission, then the EPA was re-
quired to develop and implement individual control strategies
for the state within one year.7"
Congress intended individual control strategies to prevent
toxic hot spots where multiple waste streams were discharged
into urban waterbodies.7" This scenario does not precisely fit
the Kepone situation. Nevertheless, by directing state attention
to identifying and controlling toxic pollution in urban waters,
the toxic hot spots provision of the 1987 CWA amendments
could only serve to forestall pollution such as in the Kepone
case.
C. Sewage Sludge Management
Disposal of Kepone-contaminated sewage sludge from the
Hopewell POTW in the Hopewell landfill was a symbol of a
national problem with sewage sludge disposal and manage-
ment.79 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 es-
tablished a permit program governing sewage sludge disposal,
but it was silent regarding standards for sludge disposal and
management. 0 In the 1977 CWA amendments, Congress took
a series of steps toward improving the regulation of sludge dis-
posal. Within one year of enactment, the EPA was required to
74. For an explanation of the water quality-based effluent limitation standard-set-
ting process, see NLS, supra note 2, ch. 19.
75. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(l)(1)(D) (1988).
76. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(l)(2).
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(l)(3).
78. LEG. HIST. 1987, supra note 63, at 328.
79. WATER LAW, supra at note 73, at ch. 30 and 36.
80. 33 U.S.C. 1345(a)-(c) (1988). This permit program, under section 405 of the
CWA, was separate from the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit
program administered under section 402 of the Act.
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promulgate sludge disposal and management regulations for (1)
identifying uses for sludge, (2) specifying best management
practices for sludge disposal, and (3) identifying concentrations
of toxic pollutants that might interfere with environmentally
sound sludge disposal. 1 Sludge disposal in violation of these
guidelines was declared illegal. 2 The EPA was also mandated
to submit a comprehensive study of sewage sludge management
practices to Congress by October 1, 1978."3
The EPA did little to implement these directives during the
decade following the 1977 amendments.' As a result, Congress
again addressed the sewage sludge management problem in the
Water Quality Act of 1987." The EPA was placed on a new
timetable for promulgating regulations establishing best man-
agement practices and setting numerical pollution standards for
pollutants that may be present in sewage sludge in potentially
toxic concentrations. The rulemaking process was required to be
completed by June 15, 1988, and compliance was necessary
within two years of promulgation."
For monitoring and enforcement purposes, sludge disposal
and management standards were required to be included in
POTW discharge permits under the CWA or in other federal or
state permits. 7 Requiring sludge disposal standards to be in-
cluded in POTW permits gives regulatory agencies information
regarding potentially dangerous sludge disposal practices, such
as that which occurred in the Kepone case, an incentive to
investigate those practices, and a "handle" on regulating inade-
81. 33 U.S.C. § 1345(e).
82. 33 U.S.C. § 1345(d).
83. 33 U.S.C. § 1254(d) (1988).
84. Senator Stafford remarked on the Senate floor that the EPA had
utterly failed to heed this congressional directive. Although I am told
that EPA has detected at least 76 toxic priority pollutants in POTW
sludge, it has issued rules for only two pollutants: cadmium and
PCBs-and only if these pollutants are landfilled or land spread. EPA
has set no limits whatsoever on the toxicity of marketed sewage sludge
products, and no limits on the many other toxic pollutants in sewage
sludge which is landfilled or land spread.
LEG. HIST. 1987, supra note 63, at 620.
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1345(d)-(e).
86. Id.
87. 33 U.S.C. § 1345.
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quate sludge management. However, the EPA's sludge disposal
and management program has functioned fitfully at best. The
regulations mandated by the 1987 amendments were not actu-
ally promulgated until 1993, five years after the statutory dead-
line.88 In addition, in late 1994, a federal circuit court of ap-
peals invalidated these regulations and remanded them to the
EPA.89
D. Control of Stormwater Discharges
The Clean Water Act of 1977 had given permit writers the
authority to include in discharge permits best management
practices for plant site runoff containing toxic pollutants," but
this discretionary authority was infrequently exercised.9 The
Water Quality Act of 1987 supplanted these provisions92 with
a new regulatory program designed to control industrial
stormwater discharges. Applications for stormwater discharge
permits were to be filed no later than three years from the date
of enactment; permit issuance or denial was required within
one additional year; and compliance was necessary within three
years from the date of permit issuance (October 1, 1994 at the
latest).94
The EPA's industrial stormwater control program has evolved
into a model of regulatory efficiency. 5 A stormwater discharg-
er must comply with the terms of a general permit for its in-
dustrial category." Each general permit requires the* develop-
ment and implementation of pollution prevention plans incorpo-
rating appropriate best management practices such as planning,
reporting, personnel training, preventive maintenance, and good
88. 58 Fed. Reg. 9248-9414 (Feb. 19, 1993) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 157 (1993)).
89. Leather Industries v. EPA, 40 F.3d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
90. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
91. For a case reviewing an EPA application of § 304(e) of the CWA, see
Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990).
92. Section 304(e), however, was not repealed.
93. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
94. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(4)(A).
95. See generally EPA, Final NPDS General Permits for Storm Water Discharges
Associated with Industrial Activity, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,236 (1992).
96. 57 Fed. Reg. 41,239.
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housekeeping practices. 7  Stormwater pollution prevention
plans must be reviewed and certified by a Registered Profes-
sional Engineer. 8
Had the industrial stormwater permit program been in effect
during the late 1960s and early 1970s when Kepone discharges
into the James River were taking place, regulatory agencies
would probably not have been able to ignore Life Science's
egregious neglect of Kepone raw material and waste piles at its
plant site.
V. AMENDMENTS TO THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S CRIMINAL
ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS
A. The 1972 Act and the 1977 Amendments
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, under which the Kepone defendants were prosecuted,99
provided that any person, who willfully or negligently violated a
key regulatory section of the Act or a discharge permit issued
under the Act, "shall be punished by a fine of not less than
$2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by im-
prisonment for not more than one year, or by both."100 Maxi-
mum fines and jail terms were doubled for second and subse-
quent convictions.' 01 Knowingly making a false statement in
any application, record, report, or plan required under the Act,
or knowingly tampering with a required monitoring device was
punishable by a maximum fine of $10,000 or by imprisonment
for up to six months, or by both.0 2 The term "person" was de-
fined to include "any responsible corporate officer."
0 3
97. 57 Fed. Reg. 41,242-245.
98. 57 Fed. Reg. 41,246.
99. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1988). The Kepone indictments also included a number of
counts under the Refuse Act of 1899. 33 U.S.C.A. § 401 (1988). The Refuse Act is
still effective, and possesses some advantages to prosecutors as compared to the
CWA_ But in modem environmental criminal practice, the Refuse Act is clearly subor-
dinate to the criminal provisions of the CWA_ See NLS, supra note 2, at 322-27.
100. 33 U.S.C. § 1309(c)(1) (1988).
101. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(B).
102. 33 U.S.C. § 1309(c)(2).
103. 33 U.S.C. § 1309(c)(6).
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The Clean Water Act of 1977 made no changes to the crimi-
nal enforcement sections of the CWA that would be directly
relevant to the Kepone situation or a similar incident.' 4
B. The 1987 Amendments
In the Water Quality Act of 1987, Congress refined, expand-
ed, and strengthened the CWA's criminal enforcement provi-
sions in certain fundamental respects. The $25,000 per day
maximum fine and the one year maximum jail term (double for
second offenders), applicable to both negligent and knowing
violations of regulatory requirements and discharge permits by
the 1972 Act, were restricted to negligent violation only.'
Knowing violations of regulatory provisions or discharge per-
mits are now punishable "by a fine of not less than $5,000 nor
more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for
not more than three years, or by both."05 Maximum fines and
jail sentences are doubled for subsequent convictions.'
In addition, whereas it was unclear whether the criminal
enforcement provisions of the 1972 act applied to violations of
pretreatment standards, coverage was made explicit by the
1987 amendments. A negligent or knowing violation subject to
criminal prosecution may now also include a violation of "any
requirement imposed in a pretreatment program approved un-
104. Section 54 of Pub. L. No. 95-217 did, however, (1) authorize a civil action by
EPA against a POTW and an indirect discharger where a pretreatment standard was
being violated, and (2) require that a POTW discharge permit include conditions man-
dating the POTW to identify significant sources of toxic pollutants in its influent, and
to establish a program to insure compliance with pretreatment standards by such
sources.
105. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A).
106. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(B).
107. Id.
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der" certain sections of the Act.' Moreover, it is now a crime
to negligently or knowingly introduce
into a sewer system or into a [POTW] any pollutant or
hazardous substance which [a] person knew or reasonably
should have known could cause personal injury or property
damage or, other than in compliance with all applicable
Federal, State, or local requirements or permits, which
causes such [POTW] to violate any effluent limitation or
condition in a permit issued to the [POTW] ....'0o
The maximum fine for knowingly making a false statement
or tampering with a monitoring device is still $10,000, but the
maximum jail sentence has been increased from six months to
two years.1' Maximum penalties have also been doubled for
repeat offenders."'
As a result of the 1987 amendments to the CWA, judges now
possess stronger criminal sanctions with which to punish know-
ing violators of the CWA, as were the Life Science officials
indicted in the Kepone case."' It also has been made crystal
clear that indirect dischargers, such as Life Science in the
Kepone situation, are subject to equally formidable criminal
sanctions as are their direct discharger counterparts. These
developments can only enhance the deterrent effect of the
CWA's criminal enforcement provisions in Kepone-type situa-
tions.
108. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A), (2)(A). For a case involving a conviction for kmow-
ingly introducing a pollutant into a POTW in violation of pretreatment standards (§
1319(c)(2)(A)), see United States v. Rutana, 932 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1991) (sentence
vacated and remanded for departure from Federal Sentencing Guidelines), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 300 (1991); United States v. Rutana, 18 F.3d 363 (6th Cir. 1994)
(sentence again remanded because of misinterpretation of Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines).
109. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(B). Maximum penalties, as previously described, are
based on whether the violation was negligent or knowing.
110. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4).
111. Id.
112. With regard to a public welfare offense, such as a violation of an environmen-
tal law, criminal conviction for a "knowing" violation does not require criminal intent
or "scienter" (i.e., that the perpetrator knew that his behavior was in violation of
law); it requires only that the perpetrator was, or should have been, aware of the
results of his actions. See NLS, supra note 2, at 348-56.
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C. Knowing Endangerment
The Water Quality Act of 1987 added a new crime--'knowing
endangerment"-that, on its face, appears to hold significant
potential to punish and deter outrageously unacceptable conduct
such as that which took place in the Kepone situation."'
Any person who knowingly violates a regulatory requirement
of the CWA or a discharge permit condition "and who knows at
that time that he thereby places another person in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily injury, shall, upon conviction,
be subject to a fine of not more than $250,000 or imprisonment
of not more than 15 years, or both."" The maximum fine for
organizations".5  convicted of knowing endangerment is
$1,000,000; these maximum punishments are doubled for second
and subsequent convictions."'
In determining the requisite scienter for knowing endanger-
ment, a natural person "is responsible only for actual aware-
ness or actual belief that he possessed; and knowledge pos-
sessed by a person other than the defendant but not by the
defendant himself may not be attributed to the defendant.""7
Circumstantial evidence may be introduced to prove actual
knowledge, including "evidence that the defendant took affirma-
tive steps to shield himself from relevant information.""'
Consent of the person endangered is a defense to a prosecu-
tion for knowing endangerment," but only in situations
where "the danger and conduct charged were reasonably fore-
113. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3).
114. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(A). The term "serious bodily injury" means "bodily inju-
ry which involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain,
protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function
of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty." 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(B)(iv).
115. The term "organization" means any legal entity other than a government. 33
U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(B)(iii).
116. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(A).
117. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(B)(i)(I),(II).
118. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(B)(i)(fl).
119. The affirmative defense of consent need only be proven by a preponderance of
the evidence. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(B)(ii)(fl).
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seeable hazards of-(I) an occupation, a business, or a profes-
sion; or (II) medical treatment."' °
The new crime of "knowing endangerment," which was adapt-
ed from section 3008(e) of RCRA,' was intended to provide
"enhanced felony penalties for certain life-threatening conduct
based upon knowing violation of certain predicates in the
Act." 2  The fifteen year maximum jail term for first
offenders' reflects a Congressional finding that "knowing en-
dangerments through water related- violations of Federal law
should be discouraged as strongly as possible and should be
subject to extraordinary sanctions when they occur."' Such a
lengthy maximum sentence is acceptable to society because
"[s]trong public support exists for aggressive enforcement action
in cases of environmental misconduct."'
The elements of the crime of knowing endangerment strongly
suggest application to the Kepone incident. The Life Science
workers were clearly placed in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury. Hundtofte and Moore, at least, knew that
they were violating the pretreatment requirements of the CWA.
With their long and close experience with Kepone manufactur-
ing, they also knew the profound adverse effects that Kepone
could have on human beings who came in direct contact with it.
The LSP workers could not have consented to being endangered
because their comparatively low salaries and ignorance of
Kepone's insidious effects meant that the danger was not "rea-
sonably foreseeable."
120. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(B)(ii).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e)(1988). In fact, the general strengthening of criminal penal-
ties under the Water Quality Act of 1987 was intended to resolve a disparity in crim-
inal sanctions between RORA and the CWA. See LEG. HIST. 1987, supra note 63, at
822-23, 1450-51.
122. LEG. HIST. 1987, supra note 63, at 823.
123. Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Knowing Endangerment Resulting
from Mishandling Hazardous or Toxic Substances, Pesticides or other Pollutants takes
a Base Offense Level of 24, which entails a jail sentence of between fifty-one and
sixty-three months in prison for a first offender. Sentences may be adjusted upward
for repeat violations, and if death or serious bodily injury has actually occurred.
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, section
2Q1.1.
124. LEG. HIST. 1987, supra note 63, at 1451.
125. Id.
626
CLEAN WATER ACT SINCE KEPONE
Nevertheless, an extremely narrow judicial interpretation of
the CWA's knowing endangerment provision casts doubt on
whether this crime might be applicable to Kepone-type situ-
ations. In United States v. Borowski, 6 the defendant was the
president and sole stockholder of an optical mirror manufactur-
ing company located in Burlington, Massachusetts. During the
industrial process, mirrors were dipped in nickel plating baths,
and the excess nickel was then stripped off with nitric acid.
Spent nickel plating and nitric acid baths were disposed of by
dumping them directly into plating room sinks without any
form of pretreatment. The sink outlet pipes led into the
Burlington sewer system, which terminated at the local POTW.
This means of discharging plating wastes was in violation of
pretreatment standards established by EPA regulations. 7
Company employees experienced severe health effects consis-
tent with exposure to nitric acid and nickel. Various employees
testified to having had symptoms such as nosebleeds, head-
aches, chest pains, breathing difficulties, dizziness, rashes, and
blisters. Exposure to these chemicals can also cause serious
chemical burns, permanent respiratory damage, and cancer.'
Borowski was as cavalier about his employee's health and
safety as were Hundtofte and Moore in the Kepone case:
Repeated employee exposure to the chemicals was unavoid-
able. In discharging the spent nickel plating baths and
nitric acid baths, for instance, . . . employees were told to
bail out the harmful solutions by hand using a plastic buck-
et or a portable pump. Once a tank was nearly empty it
was tipped over the edge of the sink and a scoop or small
cup was used to scoop out any remaining solution. The em-
ployees were required to scrape the sides and bottom of
nickel baths to extricate a layer of nickel byproduct....
Sometimes employees were told to dump "hot" nitiric acid
solutions into the sinks. This created an "alka seltzer" like
appearance on the surface of the sink. Employees testified
that the nickel and nitric acid solutions sometimes splashed
and spilled directly onto their skins. Indeed, one employee
126. 977 F.2d 27 (lst Cir. 1992).
127. Id at 28.
128. Id.
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complained that he was always "wet" with the solution and
at times was scalded by the chemicals. 9
Ventilation at the plating room was seriously deficient, and the
workers were not provided with respirators or other protective
gear.
30
Borowski knew that his company's inadequate waste disposal
practices created serious health risks to the employees. He also
knew that the discharges were violating pretreatment stan-
dards. However, he ignored both the complaints of his workers
and the warnings of regulatory agencies.' 3'
A federal jury convicted Borowski on two counts of knowing
endangerment." 2 On appeal, Borowski argued that the know-
ing endangerment sanction does not apply when the imminent
danger is not to sewer workers or people at the POTW,"' but
rather to employees handling the pollutants on the premises
from which the illegal discharge originates. The court agreed
with Borowski, reasoning that
there could be no violation unless the wastes ultimately
ended up in a [POTW. But the risks and dangers to these
employees would have been the same if the plugs had al-
ways remained in the sinks so that no discharge to the
[POTW] (and therefore no sec. 1317 violation) ever occurred.
The danger to the employees was inherent in their handling
of the various chemical solutions .... They would have
been subject to the identical hazards had they been dump-
ing the chemicals into drums or other containers for appro-
priate treatment under [RCRA]. In that respect, therefore,
although the defendants knew that their employees were
placed in imminent danger, that danger was not caused by
the knowing violation of sec. 1317.""
The court concluded that, unlike RCRA, "(t)he Clean Water Act
is not a statute designed to provide protection to industrial
129. Id. at 28.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 29.
132. Id.
133. The prosecutor had presented no evidence of danger to POTW workers.
134. Borowski, 977 F.2d at 30 (footnote omitted).
628
CLEAN WATER ACT SINCE KEPONE
employees who work with hazardous substances."3 ' The feder-
al government could have proceeded under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 35 but the court then conceded
that OSHA does not carry criminal penalties for unsafe practic-
es unless a death results from the employer's actions.'37
If the knowing endangerment sanction does not apply when
only industrial workers are placed in imminent danger, why did
Congress include a "consent ... to the reasonably foreseeable
hazards of an occupation" defense in the CWA's knowing endan-
germent section?'38 According to the court, this defense applies
to professional consultants called upon to advise a POTW on
how to handle an illegal, but inadvertent, indirect discharge
that has been voluntarily disclosed by the discharger.
Perhaps because the Borowski court distinguished RCRA
from the CWA in terms of the scope of their (nearly identical)
"knowing endangerment" provisions,'39 it did not refer to an-
other federal circuit court opinion, arising under RCRA, that, at
least implicitly, adopted a contrasting view of the scope of
"knowing endangerment." United States v. Protex Industries,
Inc.' was an appeal of the first conviction for knowing en-
dangerment under section 3008(e) of RCRA, the antecedent of
CWA section 309(e)."
In Protex, defendant operated a drum recycling facility, which
cleaned and repainted used drums and then used them to store
and ship products manufactured by the company. Some of these
drums previously contained hazardous materials, especially
135. Id.
136. 29 U.S.C. § 651-673 (1988 & Supp. II 1992).
137. Borowski, 977 F.2d at 31; see 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1988).
138. See sources cited supra notes 117-18.
139. The Borowski court's distinction between the scope of knowing endangerment
under RCRA and the CWA hangs by a rather slender thread:
[U]nlike the Clean Water Act, RCRA exhibits explicit concern for indus-
trial health. It has a provision specifically requiring the EPA to provide
information about employee hazards to the Secretary of Labor and OSHA
for OSHA enforcement purposes. The Clean Water Act exhibits no equiv-
alent concern for workplace dangers.
Borowski, 977 F.2d at 31 (citation omitted).
140. 874 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1989).
141. See supra note 119.
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solvents. Safety provisions for the employees were "woefully
inadequate" to protect employees against solvent poisoning,
which can cause personality disorders as well as an increased
risk of cancer. In fact, two Protex employees were suffering
from "psychoorganic syndrome," a personality disturbance that
has been associated with exposure to solvents."
Defendant argued in the appellate court that "serious bodily
injury" is unconstitutionally vague, particularly as applied to
psychological effects without corresponding physical manifesta-
tions.' The court disagreed with defendant and upheld the
conviction for knowing endangerment.'" Apparently, defen-
dant did not raise the argument that employees of a RCRA
violator are not within the ambit of the crime of knowing en-
dangerment.
The First Circuit's holding in Borowski conflicts with the
spirit of the CWA. If followed by other federal circuits, it will
virtually preclude the application of knowing endangerment to
indirect discharge situations. Prosecutors will be faced with the
overwhelming task of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
sewer and POTW workers-who work under conditions where
pollutants from multiple indirect dischargers, storm runoff from
streets, and illegal dumping into sewers, combine to form a
proverbial "chemical soup"--have been endangered by a particu-
lar defendant's discharge. The essence of the CWA's technology-
based approach to pollution control is that regulators (and pre-
sumably prosecutors) should not be compelled to "work back-
ward from an overpolluted body of water to determine which
point sources are responsible and which must be abated."45
Additionally, it is clear that in the 1977 and 1987 CWA amend-
ments Congress intended to strengthen the requirements im-
posed upon indirect dischargers to POTWs.'
Even if knowing endangerment does apply to corporate offi-
cials-like Hundtofte and Moore in the Kepone situation-who
142. Protex, 874 F.2d at 742.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 744.
145. Environmental Protection Agency v. California, 426 U.S. 200 (1976); see also
NLS, supra note 2, at ch. 19.
146. See sources cited supra notes 46-51, 80-87, 102, 106-107.
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jeopardize the health and safety of their employees through
violations of federal pollution control laws, it is doubtful wheth-
er liability for this crime could be extended easily to officials of
companies that "toll" the manufacture of hazardous chemi-
cals.14
In order to be convicted of knowing endangerment, a natural
person must have actual knowledge that his illegal conduct
placed another person in imminent danger of death or serious
bodily injury.' Circumstantial evidence can be introduced to
show actual knowledge, including evidence that the defendant
took steps to shield himself from relevant information." How-
ever, knowledge possessed by another person cannot be imputed
to the defendant. 50
The legislative history of the RCRA precursor of the knowing
endangerment section of the CWA'5' reveals that Congress
was adamant about not allowing a knowing endangerment con-
viction of a natural person to be based on vicarious knowl-
edge.'52 As for the corporations themselves, "[t]he criminal re-
sponsibility of a corporation for knowledge possessed by its
147. See supra Part I.
148. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(B)(I)(II) (1988).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 42 U.S.C. § 928(e)-(f) (1988).
152. Id. 'The knowledge necessary for culpability of a natural person is actual
knowledge, which may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence, but not
constructive or vicarious knowledge." HAZARDOUS AND SOLID WASTE AMENDMETS of
1980, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 96-1444, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1980) reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C-A4N. 5028, 5037. "It is not the purpose of this amendment either to create
criminal liability or to impose enhanced penalties for errors in judgment made with-
out the necessary scienter, however dire may be the danger in fact created." Id.
"[Slerious criminal charges are not an appropriate vehicle for second-guessing the
wisdom of judgments that are made on the basis of what was known at the time
where the person acted without the necessary element of scienter." Id. at 38-39, re-
printed in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5038. "[Klnowledge that defendant should have had,
could have had, or would have had under various circumstances does not suffice if he
did not actually have the requisite knowledge about the danger at the time he acted."
Id. at 39, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5038. "[W]hether or not vicarious knowl-
edge may be sufficient for other crimes, the new endangerment offense . . . applies
only to those people who have personal knowledge of the danger their conduct creat-
ed." Id. at 40, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. at 5039.
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officers and managing agents should be governed by traditional
principles."' 5'
The typical tolling contract insulates the tolling corporation
from the day-to-day operations of the manufacturing pro-
cess."M Furthermore, as the result of the Kepone criminal tri-
al indicates, even in the comparatively rare instance where the
tolling corporation becomes closely involved in the actual manu-
facturing and pollution control processes, it is difficult to prove
actual knowledge on the part of officials of the tolling corpora-
tion, either of statutory violations or the placing of employees
in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury by the
"tollee" company.
155
Thus, the existence of the crime of knowing endangerment in
the CWA may not, after all, be a deterrent to conduct such as
that which occurred in the Kepone case.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Amendments to the Clean Water Act in 1977 and 1987, in
addition to the enactment of other federal and state statutes
since 1972, make it highly improbable that massive, long-term,
but relatively localized, pollution of the ambient environment,
such as occurred in the Kepone situation, could take place to-
day in the United States. These CWA changes have related to
(1) control of toxic pollutants, (2) industrial stormwater man-
agement, (3) industrial pretreatment, (4) sewage sludge dispos-
al, (5) placed-based environmental protection (with an emphasis
on Chesapeake Bay), and (6) expanding and strengthening the
CWA's criminal enforcement mechanisms.
153. Id. at 37, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. at 5037.
154. See supra part I.
155. In the Kepone case, Life Science officials wrote letters to Allied Chemical
stating that Life Science was in compliance with pretreatment standards. These com-
munications were sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in Judge Mehrige's mind
whether Allied could be vicariously liable for Life Science's crimes, despite the fact
that Allied officials regularly sampled Life Science's effluent, participated in negotia-
tions between Life Science and regulatory agencies, and purchased pollution control
equipment for Life Science. No evidence was introduced in the Kepone case that
Allied officials knew about the illnesses of Life Science workers. See supra note 9.
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The progressive tightening of the CWA's regulatory and en-
forcement provisions will be indirectly beneficial to workers in
industries that use hazardous chemicals in their manufacturing
processes and discharge wastes into waterbodies or POTWs.
Adoption of best available technologies to decrease toxic dis-
charges and best management practices to control stormwater
runoff of hazardous materials will mean cleaner and safer
workplaces as well as less polluted ambient environments. The
trend toward pollution prevention156 portends the substitution
of less hazardous materials for more hazardous materials in
manufacturing processes. But, as the Kepone and Borowski
cases indicate, worker health and safety, especially in industries
that are indirect dischargers, are still only an afterthought of
water pollution control law, even though, ironically, acute ef-
fects on worker health often provide our initial warning of sig-
nificant water pollution problems. 57
The Clean Water Act should be amended to bring workers in
discharging industries within "the environment" that the stat-
ute protects. Specifically, the following policy should be added
to section 101 of the Act,' entitled "Declaration Of Goals
And Policy":
It is the national policy that the health and safety of work-
ers in discharging facilities are within the scope of this Act,
and should, wherever possible, consistent with other laws,
be protected by the administration of this Act.
Section 309(c)(3) 15 9 should also be amended to overturn the
Borowski decision and clarify that workers in discharging facili-
ties are within the ambit of the crime of knowing endanger-
ment.
156. See, e.g., NLS, supra note 2, at 1036-37.
157. In this sense, workers are indeed the "miner's canary" of pollution control.
158. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988).
159. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (1988).
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